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ABSTRACT 
 
Review correspondence between the SEC and firms is a potentially valuable resource for 
investors. Review correspondence often reveals information about firms’ financial reporting 
quality, which has important implications for investors’ processing of financial information and 
investment judgments. However, there is little evidence on how characteristics of review 
correspondence influence investors’ decision processes. Drawing on psychology theory, I predict 
that two key informational characteristics—review ambiguity (i.e., a lack of transparency about 
outcomes from the SEC’s review process) and access costs (i.e., the amount of effort required to 
access review correspondence)—jointly influence investors’ information processing and their 
resulting investment judgments. Results show that investors integrate information to a greater 
extent as review ambiguity decreases, but only when access costs are relatively low. Review 
ambiguity has no effect on investors’ integration of review correspondence information when 
access costs are relatively high. Further, review ambiguity and access costs also jointly affect 
investors’ resulting investment judgments. My results provide important new insights on 
potential costs to investors from the extent of SEC transparency during its review process, 
particularly as information becomes more easily accessible. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
Review correspondence between the SEC and firms often reveals valuable information 
about firms’ financial reporting quality (Cassell, Dreher, and Myers 2013; Dechow, Lawrence, 
and Ryans 2016; Ryans 2018). For example, Dechow et al. (2016) show that managers anticipate 
the informational value of review correspondence to market participants, increasing their trading 
prior to the public release of review correspondence and profiting from their trades. Other studies 
also underscore the value of review correspondence as a source of financial reporting quality 
information (Gietzmann and Isidro 2013; Cunningham, Schmardebeck, and Wang 2017; Ryans 
2018). Despite the potential usefulness of review correspondence for investors, and particularly 
nonprofessional investors, there is little evidence on how psychological factors influence 
investors’ reactions to this important information. In this study, I focus on two key characteristics 
of SEC review correspondence information (hereafter, informational characteristics) that are 
likely to have important consequences for investors. Specifically, I examine how review 
ambiguity (i.e., a lack of transparency about outcomes from the SEC’s review process) and 
access costs (i.e., the amount of effort required to access review correspondence) jointly 
influence investors’ processing of firm financial information and investment judgments.1 
Understanding the effects of these two informational characteristics is important given 
regulators’ and standard-setters’ renewed focus on increasing the usefulness and accessibility of 
financial information for investors (FASB 2018; IFRS Foundation 2018; SEC 2018c). For 
nonprofessional investors, review correspondence is an especially valuable source of reporting 
																																																								
1 My definition of review ambiguity is consistent with other studies that define ambiguity as missing information 
that is relevant and could be known (e.g., Frisch and Baron 1988; Camerer and Weber 1992; Winchel 2015). 
Information may be missing either due to cognitive or informational constraints and prevents one from 
understanding the probabilities of outcomes (Ju and Miao 2012; Williams 2015). Ambiguity, or “Knightian”  
uncertainty, is conceptually distinct from risk, or measurable uncertainty (Knight 1921; Ellsberg 1961; White 2017). 
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quality information that is likely underutilized. Under current practice, the SEC only reveals the 
outcome when it reviews a firm’s financial report and has comments—it does not reveal the 
outcome when it reviews a firm’s financial report and has no comments or when it does not 
provide any review. Importantly, these latter two review outcomes (no comments or no review) 
comprise the majority of review outcomes (Deloitte 2016; SEC 2018a, 2018b). In contrast to this 
high review ambiguity environment, the SEC could reduce review ambiguity by revealing when 
any of the three outcomes occur. In addition, although available on EDGAR, investors face 
difficulties in accessing review correspondence. For example, each piece of correspondence is 
posted separately, release timing is unpredictable, file labels are unintuitive, and neither the SEC 
nor firms provide notice when new correspondence is available. While reducing review 
ambiguity or access costs could each have significant consequences for investors, my study 
underscores the importance of considering these two informational characteristics jointly rather 
than independently.  
I draw on psychology theory to predict that review ambiguity and access costs will have 
an interactive effect on investors’ processing of review correspondence information.2 Prior 
research shows that ambiguity often influences individuals’ decision processes and suggests that 
investors will integrate review correspondence information to a greater extent as review 
ambiguity decreases. However, the effects of review ambiguity on investors’ integration are 
likely to depend on the access costs investors face, given that prior research indicates other 
informational characteristics will have a weaker effect as access costs increase (i.e., when greater 
																																																								
2 Information processing consists of both acquisition and integration (Maines and McDaniel 2000; Hodge, Kennedy, 
and Maines 2004). In the context of review correspondence, acquisition reflects whether investors view the review 
correspondence information. Integration reflects investors’ assessment of the information and the extent to which the 
information is incorporated into their judgments. Investors’ acquisition of review correspondence is likely to depend 
on the access costs faced. However, my theoretical predictions largely focus on review ambiguity and access costs 
jointly influencing investors’ integration of review correspondence information, which is necessary for processing 
to occur. 
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effort increases integration). Thus, when access costs are relatively low, I predict investors will 
integrate review correspondence information to a greater extent as review ambiguity decreases. 
In contrast, review ambiguity is less likely to affect investors’ integration of review 
correspondence information when access costs are relatively high. That is, I expect higher access 
costs will have a dominant effect on investors’ integration and, thus, will operate as a boundary 
condition on the effects of review ambiguity. Further, because review correspondence is useful 
in evaluating and comparing investment alternatives, review ambiguity and access costs should 
also have an interactive effect on investors’ investment judgments. 
 I examine my predictions using two experiments. Experiment 1 employs a 2 × 2 
between-subjects design, using Masters in accountancy students enrolled in a financial statement 
analysis course as participants. Participants evaluate two firms as potential investments, based on 
the firms’ financial reports and review correspondence from a “Regulator.” There are three 
possible review outcomes for each firm: review with comments, review without comments, or no 
review. The first firm’s (MoveCorp’s) review correspondence is the same in all conditions and 
reveals a one-time gain that temporarily reduced its selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) 
expenses. I manipulate review ambiguity by varying how revealing the Regulator is regarding 
review outcomes for the second firm. Participants learn that the Regulator either issues a review 
letter only when the Regulator reviews and has comments, consistent with current SEC practice 
(High Ambiguity) or for all three review outcomes (Low Ambiguity). Further, for the second firm, 
the Regulator either provides no review letter, consistent with current SEC practice (High 
Ambiguity) or discloses that it reviewed the firm’s financial report and had no comments (Low 
Ambiguity).3 I manipulate access costs by varying the amount of effort required to access the 
																																																								
3 My manipulation of review ambiguity is a joint manipulation of ambiguity regarding review outcomes generally 
and the second firm’s review outcome (review with no comments). Prior experimental accounting research explains 
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review correspondence. Participants answer 15 simple algebra questions (High Cost) or can view 
the review correspondence without answering any questions (Low Cost).  
 Participants compute financial ratios for each firm, indicate willingness to invest, and 
respond to other measures. If participants do not process MoveCorp’s review correspondence 
information, then MoveCorp appears to be the better performing firm. However, if participants 
process MoveCorp’s review correspondence information and adjust MoveCorp’s SG&A 
expenses for the one-time gain, then the second firm appears to be the better performing firm.  
Results from Experiment 1 show that review ambiguity and access costs jointly influence 
investors’ integration and, thus, processing of review correspondence information. Specifically, 
investors integrate review correspondence information to a greater extent as review ambiguity 
decreases, but only when access costs are relatively low. In contrast, review ambiguity has no 
effect on investors’ integration when access costs are relatively high, consistent with the 
dominant effect of access costs on investors’ integration. Investors’ investment judgments also 
reflect their differing information processing.  
To provide convergent evidence, Experiment 2 employs a 1 × 2 between-subjects design 
and a similar pool of participants. I use an alternative Low Ambiguity operationalization, where 
the second firm’s review correspondence states that the Regulator did not review its financial 
report, and manipulate access costs in the same manner (high or low) as in Experiment 1. 
Importantly, results for investors’ information processing are inferentially similar to Experiment 
1, confirming that investors’ processing depends on overall review ambiguity rather than the 
																																																								
that compound manipulations are common when two aspects of a construct vary in the natural setting, as they do 
with review correspondence. Further, compound manipulations can improve the generalizable inferences that can be 
made from a study’s findings (Kadous, Kennedy, and Peecher 2003; Kadous, Leiby, and Peecher 2013; Bol and 
Leiby 2018). In Experiment 2, I examine an alternative operationalization of review ambiguity, where the Regulator 
reveals that it did not review the second firm’s financial report. Information processing results are inferentially 
similar to Experiment 1, confirming that investors’ processing depends on overall review ambiguity rather than the 
second firm’s review outcome (no comments or no review). 
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second firm’s review outcome. However, results show investors’ investment judgments differ 
depending on the nature of the second firm’s review outcome (no comments or no review). Even 
though financial information about the second firm is identical across conditions, investors are 
less likely to invest in the non-reviewed firm when the Regulator reveals a no-review outcome. 
Collectively, my results provide important new insights on potential costs to investors and firms 
from the extent of SEC transparency during its review process, particularly as information 
becomes more easily accessible.  
I contribute to prior literature and practice in several important ways. Prior literature 
indicates that both ambiguity and access costs have important consequences for individuals’ 
decision processes, including affecting information search (Zimbelman and Waller 1999), 
information processing (Williams 2015; Winchel 2015; White 2017), and judgments (Nelson and 
Tayler 2007; Smith, Tayler, and Prawitt 2016; Grant 2018). I contribute to these literatures by 
providing evidence that the effects of review ambiguity and access costs on investors’ 
information processing and judgments depend on one another. Further, my results show that 
review ambiguity can substantially affect investors’ processing for firms with review 
correspondence (i.e., when there is no uncertainty about the review outcome for that firm). To 
my knowledge, my study is also the first to examine how ambiguity about review outcomes 
affects investors’ information processing and judgments. These findings are likely to take on a 
heightened importance as the availability of information about external review and oversight 
processes (e.g., auditors’ critical audit matter discussions) increases. 
 This study also has important practical implications. Using an experimental approach 
allows me to provide ex ante evidence on conditions that do not currently exist in practice 
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(Elliott 2015).4 My results may help inform the SEC and other regulators and standard-setters on 
the potential implications of reducing review ambiguity and access costs, underscoring the 
importance of considering these two informational characteristics jointly rather than 
independently. I provide evidence that reducing access costs may actually harm investors’ 
integration unless the SEC also reduces ambiguity about review outcomes, consistent with calls 
from investor groups for greater transparency (e.g., SEC Insight 2004). At the same time, results 
from Experiment 2 indicate that reducing review ambiguity may also have unintended 
consequences for firms that do not undergo a regulatory review. Finally, the SEC justifies its 
decision to not reveal certain information during the filing review process as helping preserve the 
integrity of the review process (SEC 2018b), though it also recognizes demand for review 
correspondence information and its potential value to investors (SEC 2005; SEC 2011). My 
results may help the SEC better understand how measures taken to improve the efficacy of 
regulatory oversight affect the usefulness of information for investors.  
  
																																																								
4 I use an abstract manipulation of access costs to improve internal validity and enhance the generalizable inferences 
from my study (Elliott 2015). From a practical perspective, the SEC could reduce access costs in a number of ways, 
including making review correspondence easier to access on EDGAR (clarifying labeling, combining 
correspondence into a single file, etc.) or requiring firms to disclose review correspondence in their financial reports 
or on their company websites.  
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND PRIOR LITERATURE 
2.1 FRAMEWORK OF REPORTING QUALITY INDICATORS 
Regulators, standard-setters, and academic researchers all emphasize the importance of 
firm financial reporting quality to investors (Dechow, Ge, and Schrand 2010; FASB 2010; SEC 
2018c). Reporting quality affects both expectations and the perceived riskiness of earnings and 
cash flows (Hribar and Jenkins 2004; Beneish, Billings, and Hodder 2008) and has important 
implications for investors’ processing of financial information and investment judgments. 
Despite the importance of reporting quality to their judgments, investors face significant 
challenges in actually assessing firm reporting quality. A large accounting literature examines 
proxies for firms’ earnings quality and audit quality, two critical components of reporting quality 
(Dechow et al. 2010; DeFond and Zhang 2014). For example, prior research suggests that certain 
earnings attributes (e.g., earnings persistence, smoothness, etc.) are indicative of higher earnings 
quality.5 However, many of these proxies are unlikely to be useful for investors due to their 
complexity and the need to evaluate across multiple periods. Instead, any reporting quality 
indicators (i.e., publicly-available information that is informative about a firm’s financial 
reporting) are likely to be particularly important for investors. 
Figure 1 presents a framework of prominent reporting quality indicators for investors, 
detailing the source of the indicator, constructs examined in prior studies, and the type of 
reporting quality signal provided for investors. Drawing on the FASB’s Conceptual Framework 
for Financial Reporting (FASB 2010), I propose that reporting quality indicators are useful for 
investors when they help investors assess overall firm reporting quality and/or analyze firms’ 
																																																								
5 Prior research on earnings quality largely focuses on the association between various earnings attributes (e.g., 
persistence, smoothness, accruals, etc.) and equity valuation, showing that more favorable attributes (e.g., greater 
persistence, smoothness, lower discretionary accruals, etc.) are associated with higher equity valuations and price 
responses (e.g., Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2004; Francis et al. 2005; Dechow et al. 2010).  
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financial information. Several qualitative characteristics may enhance the usefulness of 
indicators for investors. First, indicators are more likely to be useful when they are able to reflect 
greater variation in reporting quality (DeFond and Zhang 2014). Indicators that signal only 
severe reporting issues (e.g., SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs)) 
may provide a powerful signal of overall reporting quality but may not be as helpful for investors 
in analyzing firm financial reports. Second, greater accessibility can enhance the usefulness of 
indicators. Third, greater interpretability can enhance the usefulness of an indicator. 
Interpretability reflects an indicator’s understandability as well as its comparability.6 Finally, 
greater timeliness may enhance an indicator’s usefulness.    
 Importantly, reporting quality indicators differ significantly across these various 
qualitative characteristics. For example, two prominent indicators that may provide a strong 
signal of overall reporting quality are AAERs and restatements issued by firms.7 Consistent with 
investors using these indicators to adjust their perceptions of firm reporting quality, prior studies 
document negative price reactions to the announcement of both AAERs (Feroz et al. 1991; 
Dechow et al. 1996; Karpoff et al. 2008) and restatements (e.g., Hribar and Jenkins 2004; 
Palmrose et al. 2004). While both indicators may be helpful in identifying firms with low 
reporting quality, they are increasingly uncommon and often untimely, which limits their 
usefulness to investors. For example, in 2016, the SEC issued only 109 AAERs, the vast 
majority of which did not target public companies (Floyd Advisory 2017). Restatement rates are 
																																																								
6 The FASB’s Conceptual Framework (2010) identifies understandability and comparability as two distinct 
qualitative characteristics. For purposes of my framework, I combine these two characteristics into a single construct 
because I expect that both are necessary to meaningfully enhance the usefulness of an indicator for investors. 
7 Another external indicator of reporting quality is the disclosure rankings developed by the Association for 
Investment Management and Research (AIMR). A committee of security analysts develops the AIMR rankings, 
which provide quantitative scores for firm disclosure quality based upon annual reports, interim reports, and investor 
relation activities (Bushee and Noe 1999; Bens and Monahan 2004). Although several studies use the AIMR 
rankings as proxies for disclosure quality (e.g., Bens and Monahan 2004), there is little evidence that investors 
access or use the rankings when assessing firm financial reporting quality.  
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also at historical lows, with only 130 reissuance restatements issued in 2016 (Bonaldi 2017). 
AAERs and restatements are also often issued years after the related financial reports. 
 Two other prominent indicators that may offer valuable information about reporting 
quality are internal control disclosures and opinions and auditor-provided discussions of critical 
audit matters (CAMs). First, SOX requires firms to include internal control disclosures in their 
periodic filings, certifying the firm’s internal control system and disclosing weaknesses when 
discovered. Auditors are also required to provide an annual opinion on the firm’s internal 
controls. Research shows that firms’ cost of capital increases around the disclosure of internal 
control issues, consistent with investors reassessing information risk at firms (Beneish et al. 
2008; Hammersley et al. 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009) (for an exception, see Ogneva et al. 
2007).8 In addition to affecting perceived information risk at firms, Beneish et al. (2008) show 
that internal control disclosures also lead to changes in cash flow expectations. Second, 
beginning in 2019, U.S. auditors are required to include discussions of CAMs in their audit 
reports (PCAOB 2017). Research suggests that discussions of CAMs are likely to influence 
investors’ assessments of firm reporting quality as well as their investment judgments 
(Christensen et al. 2014; Elliott et al. 2018). However, other studies examining expanded auditor 
opinions in the United Kingdom indicate that the informational value of these opinions may be 
limited (e.g., Gutierrez et al. 2017; Lennox et al. 2017). 
Although internal control disclosures and opinions and discussions of CAMs may 
provide investors with valuable information about reporting quality, there are important 
limitations to their usefulness. Both indicators are indirect signals of financial reporting quality. 
Firms are primarily responsible for disclosing any internal control issues, and only some of the 
																																																								
8 While investors react negatively to the initial disclosure of internal control issues, research shows investors react 
positively to the remediation of such issues (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009; Cheng et al. 2013). 
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disclosures are actually audited. In addition, these disclosures focus on internal control issues 
and may be less useful for assessing reporting quality or analyzing firms’ financial reports. 
Similarly, while discussions of CAMs may highlight potential reporting issues for investors, their 
primary purpose is to identify audit areas involving challenging, subjective, or complex 
judgments (PCAOB 2017). In sum, prior research highlights the importance of reporting quality 
to investors, but investors face significant challenges in assessing firm reporting quality given the 
few public indicators available to them and the limitations associated with those indicators. 
Review correspondence has several potential advantages over alternative indicators of 
reporting quality. Review correspondence is initiated by a compliance expert and focuses 
specifically on firms’ financial reporting (SEC Insight 2004; Gietzmann and Isidro 2013; Grove, 
Johnsen, and Lung 2016). The SEC has expertise in reporting and accounting matters and thus is 
capable of commenting on an array of financial reporting issues. Further, unlike other reporting 
quality indicators, review correspondence is pervasive. Over 50 percent of public firms are 
reviewed annually (SEC 2018a), and, in 2017, the SEC issued over 4,000 comment letters to 
1,120 different firms (Bonaldi 2018).  
 
2.2 SEC REGULATORY OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW CORRESPONDENCE  
The SEC provides regulatory oversight of public firms by selectively reviewing corporate 
filings, targeting disclosures that appear “to be materially deficient in explanation or clarity” 
(SEC 2018b).9 The SEC issues a comment letter when it believes that a company can improve its 
																																																								
9 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) requires the SEC to review each public firm’s filings at least once every 
three years, although some firms receive more frequent reviews. For example, in 2017, the SEC reviewed 56 percent 
of public firms (SEC 2018a). Although the SEC does not disclose the criteria used for selecting firms to review, 
Section 408 of SOX directs the SEC to consider a variety of factors, including a firm’s history of past restatements, 
stock price volatility, and size, as well as any other factors the SEC believes to be relevant. Filing reviews may 
consist of a full cover-to-cover review, a review of only financial statements and related disclosures, or a targeted 
review of specific disclosures. In some comment letters, the SEC asks the firm to provide additional information to 
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disclosures or enhance its compliance with applicable requirements (SEC 2018b). Among the 
most popular recent comment topics are firms’ discussion of results of operations in the MD&A, 
critical accounting policies and estimates, non-GAAP measures, fair value reporting, segment 
reporting, income taxes, and revenue recognition (Deloitte 2016). Appendix A presents an 
example SEC comment letter. The firm and SEC correspond until the SEC is satisfied with the 
firm’s responses, at which point the SEC issues a completion letter. Review correspondence is 
later released on EDGAR (SEC 2005; SEC 2011).10 
Review correspondence frequently reveals information useful to investors in assessing 
firms’ reporting quality (Cassell et al. 2013; Dechow et al. 2016; Ryans 2018). For example, 
Dechow et al. (2016) show that managers anticipate the informational value of revenue 
recognition comment letters and increase trading prior to their public release. Similarly, other 
market participants recognize the usefulness of review correspondence information for financial 
reporting quality assessments and investment decisions, including institutional investors 
(Greenlight Capital 2011; Pershing Square 2012; Gietzmann and Isidro 2013; Prescience Point 
2013) and banks (Cunningham et al. 2017). 
Despite the potential usefulness of SEC review correspondence for investors, prior 
archival research provides mixed evidence on investor reactions to its public release. Dechow et 
al. (2016) find a negative short-term reaction to the release of revenue recognition comment 
letters and a negative post-release drift. Similarly, Edwards, Klassen, and Pinto (2018) find 
negative reactions to the release of tax-related comment letters for tax aggressive firms. Ryans 
																																																								
help it interpret the firm’s filing. In others, the SEC asks the firm to amend its filings or revise disclosures in future 
filings. Many filing reviews are completed without the issuance of a comment letter. 
10 Before 2005, review correspondence required a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to access. Beginning 
in 2005, the SEC changed its policy to publicly disclose all correspondence to expand transparency and level the 
playing field for potential users (SEC 2005). In addition to EDGAR, correspondence is also available on research 
platforms like Audit Analytics and LexisNexis. 
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(2018) uses several measures (returns, EDGAR downloads, and text) to identify important 
comment letters, finding that such comment letters can predict lower future earnings, 
restatements, and write-downs. In contrast, other studies provide evidence of little or no investor 
reaction to the release of review correspondence (Johnson 2015; Johnston and Petacchi 2017). 
Other studies show that review correspondence may also lead to subsequent changes in firms’ 
disclosure and operating choices (Bens, Cheng, and Neamtiu 2016; Kubick, Lynch, Mayberry, 
and Omer 2016; Johnston and Petacchi 2017).  
 
2.3 REVIEW AMBIGUITY AND ACCESS COSTS  
The SEC justifies its decision not to reveal certain information during the filing review 
process as helping preserve the integrity of the process (SEC 2018b). For example, full 
transparency about review outcomes could allow managers to anticipate when a review will (or 
will not) occur. Further, investors may inappropriately interpret a no-comments outcome as a 
certification of the firm’s financial reporting. As a result, under the SEC’s current approach, 
review correspondence is only available when the SEC both reviews and comments on a firm’s 
filings. When the SEC reviews a firm’s filings and has no comments, the SEC does not issue a 
comment letter or other notification. Similarly, if the SEC does not review a firm’s filings, it 
does not provide any notification. Thus, the SEC currently only reveals when one of three review 
outcomes occur. Instead, and consistent with other SEC actions meant to increase the usefulness 
of review correspondence (SEC 2005, 2011), the SEC could reveal when any of the three review 
outcomes occur. This includes when the SEC reviews a firm’s filings and has no comments or 
when it does not review a firm’s filings, as it does for registration statements (SEC 2015).  
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Prior studies suggest that the limited market reactions to the public release of review 
correspondence may be partly attributable to the relatively high costs associated with accessing 
review correspondence, including the unintuitive disclosure on EDGAR, unpredictability of 
release timing, and low accessibility on firm websites (Dechow et al. 2016; Ryans 2018).11 Each 
filing is posted separately on EDGAR, requiring investors to separately search for and review 
each part of the correspondence. Firms are only required to disclose any unresolved comments in 
their filings, which are rare. Prior studies imply that reducing access costs may be one way to 
increase the usefulness of review correspondence for investors. However, reducing access costs 
may have limited benefits, since investors must not only acquire review correspondence but also 
integrate the information into their judgments. Further, as access costs decrease, other 
informational characteristics like review ambiguity are likely to take on increased importance. 
  
																																																								
11 Consistent with investors being inattentive to the initial release of review correspondence, over 80 percent of 
review correspondence receives no search requests on the day of public release (Dechow et al. 2016). 
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CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 In this section, I develop theory to predict that review ambiguity and access costs will 
jointly influence investors’ processing of review correspondence information and investment 
judgments. Review ambiguity reflects a lack of transparency about outcomes from the SEC’s  
review process, while access costs reflect the amount of effort required to access review 
correspondence. Psychology theory suggests that the two informational characteristics will have 
important consequences for investors’ judgments. Below, I first provide background on 
information processing and then separately examine the effects of review ambiguity and access 
costs on investors’ processing of review correspondence information. Finally, I develop theory to 
predict that review ambiguity and access costs will have an interactive effect on investors’ 
information processing and investment judgments.  
 
3.1 INFORMATION PROCESSING AND PRIOR LITERATURE 
Investors must process the information in review correspondence for the correspondence 
to be useful to their judgments. Information processing consists of acquisition and integration 
(Maines and McDaniel 2000; Hodge et al. 2004). In the context of review correspondence, 
acquisition reflects whether an investor views the review correspondence. Integration (or 
evaluation and reliance) reflects an investor’s assessment of the information and the extent to 
which an investor takes the information into account. The components of information processing 
operate sequentially, with acquisition necessary before integration can occur (Maines and 
McDaniel 2000).  
 Prior research indicates that a variety of informational characteristics, or descriptive 
attributes of information, affect information processing. Informational characteristics include 
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both “internal” characteristics (i.e., attributes inherent to the information) as well as “external” 
characteristics (i.e., attributes of the environment within which the information is made 
available). For example, internal characteristics include attributes such as location, salience, and 
categorization, while external characteristics include attributes such as timing or the medium 
through which information is disseminated. Importantly, both internal and external 
characteristics have important consequences for users, including affecting how users process the 
information (Libby and Emett 2014). In the following sections, I develop theory to predict that 
two external informational characteristics—review ambiguity and access costs—will jointly 
influence investors’ processing and investment judgments.12  
 
3.2 REVIEW AMBIGUITY 
Research suggests that review ambiguity (i.e., a lack of transparency about outcomes 
from the SEC’s review process) can have important consequences for investors. Prior research 
indicates that ambiguity affects individuals’ decision processes. Consistent with prior research, I 
define ambiguity as missing information that is relevant and could be known (e.g., Frisch and 
Baron 1988; Camerer and Weber 1992; Winchel 2015). Ambiguity can arise from a lack of 
information, including about the information-generating process (e.g., Zimbelman and Waller 
1999; Wu and Tuttle 2014; Winchel 2015), or a lack of precision or reliability (e.g., Nelson, 
Bloomfield, Hales, and Libby 2001; Han and Tan 2010; Tang, Zarowin, and Zhang 2015; White 
2017). When facing ambiguity, individuals often exhibit “ambiguity aversion,” or a preference 
																																																								
12 Both review ambiguity and access costs relate to the broader construct of transparency. Although defined in 
various ways in the literature, transparency is typically conceptualized as revealing information in a way that is 
readily understandable to users (e.g., Hodge et al. 2004; Barth and Schipper 2008; Elliott, Krische, and Peecher 
2010). With internal informational characteristics, transparency and access costs are often inherently linked. For 
example, the location of information often affects both the information’s transparency and accessibility to users. In 
contrast, with external informational characteristics, transparency and access costs are more likely to be 
conceptually distinct. Thus, it is important to examine the construct of access costs on its own. 
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for unambiguous choices over ambiguous choices, even when expected values are identical 
(Ellsberg 1961; Einhorn and Hogarth 1985; Frisch and Baron 1988). Ambiguity can make 
individuals shy away from making decisions or taking either side of a bet (Heath and Tversky 
1991; Camerer and Weber 1992), though other studies suggest that individuals may be 
insensitive to uncertainty regarding information reliability (Bloomfield, Libby, and Nelson 2000; 
Nelson et al. 2001; Wainberg, Kida, Piercey, and Smith 2013). 
Ambiguity can also have significant consequences for individuals’ information 
processing (Epstein and Schneider 2008; Han and Tan 2010; Tang et al. 2015). For example, 
greater ambiguity increases investors’ susceptibility to motivated reasoning (Han and Tan 2010). 
Ambiguity is also shown to affect individuals’ information search strategies (Zimbelman and 
Waller 1999) and their reliance on heuristic cues when evaluating informational credibility 
(Winchel 2015; Kelton and Montague 2018).  
Importantly, other research suggests that ambiguity often leads to reduced information 
integration. For example, individuals frequently discount or even disregard information with an 
ambiguous component, even when it is value relevant (Van Dijk and Zeelenberg 2003; Caskey 
2009; Wu and Tuttle 2014). Ambiguity creates additional complexity when interpreting 
information and, thus, discounting may arise from a variety of cognitive or motivational 
factors.13 Collectively, these studies suggest that integration is likely to differ based on the 
																																																								
13 Other studies suggest that greater ambiguity may actually increase investors’ information integration. For 
example, research shows that individuals often use a “max-min” axiom when evaluating information in ambiguous 
situations (Ellsberg 1961). Consistent with ambiguity aversion, investors react more strongly to bad news than good 
news as uncertainty increases (Epstein and Schneider 2008; Williams 2015; White 2017), and analysts place greater 
weight on the lower-end of management guidance ranges (Tang et al. 2015). I expect that greater review ambiguity 
will decrease investors’ integration for at least two reasons. First, the ambiguity inherent in my setting relates to the 
interpretability of review correspondence information (i.e., when there is no uncertainty about the review outcome 
for that firm), whereas prior studies frequently examine situations where there is uncertainty regarding the precision 
of the underlying information. Second, while review correspondence information is a helpful reporting quality 
indicator, investors are still able to process firm financial information and make their investment judgments without 
considering the implications of the information. Thus, I expect the likelihood of discounting review correspondence 
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ambiguity in the information environment, particularly in the absence of other cues affecting 
processing. 
Under the SEC’s current review process, investors can observe when the SEC reviews 
and issues comments, but they cannot observe when the SEC reviews a firm’s filings and has no 
comments or when it does not review at all. This asymmetric production of review 
correspondence creates ambiguity regarding the review status of firms without review 
correspondence. In addition, for firms with review correspondence, investors encounter 
significant environmental ambiguity given that they lack sufficient information to even 
understand the probabilities of various review outcomes. This ambiguity in the information 
environment presents challenges to investors when trying to evaluate the implications of the 
review correspondence. Greater review ambiguity makes it more difficult for investors to 
understand the implications of the information because it is not clear what triggered the review 
correspondence or how serious or extensive an identified concern is among firms. As a result, 
greater review ambiguity makes it more difficult for investors to use review correspondence to 
evaluate and compare firms.  
Accordingly, I expect investors are less likely to integrate review correspondence 
information as review ambiguity increases. In contrast, lower review ambiguity makes it easier 
for investors to assess the information’s implications and make comparisons across firms. As a 
result, investors are more likely to integrate review correspondence information as review 
ambiguity decreases, which should, in turn, improve investors’ ability to evaluate and compare 
firms. Importantly, however, the effect of review ambiguity on investors’ integration is likely to 
depend on other informational characteristics, including access costs. 
																																																								
information to be greater in my setting than when the underlying information is a required input to investors’ 
judgments. 
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3.3 ACCESS COSTS  
Prior studies suggest that access costs (i.e., the amount of effort required to access review 
correspondence) will also have important consequences for investors’ processing of review 
correspondence information. Reducing access costs is likely to increase acquisition of review 
correspondence information (Bucklin 1966; Ratchford 1982; Smith, Vekatraman, and Dholakia 
1999). However, investors’ processing ultimately depends on their integration of the 
information. Research shows that how individuals acquire information influences the extent to 
which the information is integrated and affects their judgments. Specifically, information affects 
judgments to a greater extent when individuals seek out or exert more effort to acquire the 
information. For example, Bastardi and Shafir (1998) and Redelmeier, Shafir, and Aujla (2001) 
provide evidence that nondiagnostic (irrelevant) information affects judgments to a greater extent 
when individuals seek out the information. Similarly, Nelson and Tayler (2007) show that 
information has a greater effect on financial statement users’ judgments when users must expend 
more effort to acquire the information. Grant (2018) provides evidence that, by influencing the 
effort exerted by investors, information choice in firms’ financial disclosures affects investors’ 
processing. These studies suggest that increased integration is consistent with individuals relying 
on external cues like effort to guide their judgments. 
 Consistent with this literature, I expect investors are more likely to integrate information 
when they exert more effort to acquire the information. Conversely, when less effort is required, 
investors are less likely to integrate the information, since effort no longer operates as a cue to 
increase information integration. Accordingly, by decreasing the effort required of investors, 
reducing access costs is likely to have a negative effect on investors’ integration and, thus, 
processing of review correspondence information. Further, in the absence of high access costs, 
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other informational characteristics, like review ambiguity, are likely to exert a stronger effect on 
investors’ processing.    
 
3.4 JOINT EFFECTS OF REVIEW AMBIGUITY AND ACCESS COSTS ON 
INFORMATION PROCESSING AND INVESTMENT JUDGMENTS  
Collectively, prior research suggests that review ambiguity and access costs will have an 
interactive effect on investors’ processing of review correspondence information and investment 
judgments. While reducing access costs should increase acquisition of review correspondence 
information, investors’ processing of review correspondence ultimately depends on integrating 
the information. It is plausible that review ambiguity may affect investors’ integration similarly 
regardless of access costs. However, research suggests that access costs are likely to serve as a 
boundary condition on the effects of review ambiguity on investors’ integration.  
Prior studies show that pursuit of information and greater effort increase processing of 
both diagnostic and nondiagnostic information (Bastardi and Shafir 1998; Nelson and Tayler 
2007; Grant 2018). That is, the manner in which individuals access information has a dominant 
effect on how they integrate the information, increasing reliance on information that is not even 
decision-relevant. This implies that, when access costs are relatively high, investors are less 
likely to be influenced by other informational characteristics and, therefore, review ambiguity is 
likely to have a diminished influence on investors’ integration. Conversely, when access costs 
are relatively low, review ambiguity is likely to have a stronger effect on investors’ integration of 
review correspondence information. Specifically, investors’ integration of review 
correspondence information should increase as review ambiguity decreases (i.e., the SEC is more 
transparent about its review outcomes).  
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To summarize, I predict that review ambiguity and access costs will have an interactive 
effect on investors’ integration and, thus, processing of review correspondence information.14 
Further, when review correspondence reveals information that is useful in assessing firms’ 
reporting quality, increased processing of the review correspondence information should 
improve investors’ ability to compare and evaluate firms’ financial information.15 This leads to 
my hypotheses: 
 H1: The effect of review ambiguity on investors’ processing of review correspondence 
information will strengthen as access costs decrease. 
 
H2: As access costs decrease, investors’ comparative investment judgments will reflect 
review correspondence information to a greater extent as review ambiguity decreases. 
Importantly, the SEC reduces review ambiguity when it reveals that it reviewed a firm’s 
financial report and had no comments (no-comments outcome) or when it reveals that it did not 
review a firm’s financial report (no-review outcome). While either outcome should lead to 
improved information processing consistent with H1, it is possible that the effects on 
comparative investment judgments could differ based upon the nature of the revealed outcome. 
For example, when the SEC reveals a no-comments outcome, investors can more easily compare 
the two firms because both received regulatory review. In contrast, revealing a no-review 
outcome may actually increase ambiguity about the non-reviewed firm.16 Thus, I separately 
examine when review ambiguity is reduced with a no-comments outcome (Experiment 1) and a 
																																																								
14 I frame my first hypothesis in terms of processing rather than integration to also account for the negative effect of 
access costs on acquisition. Accordingly, I do not make directional predictions for overall information processing—
rather, my first hypothesis reflects the differing effects of review ambiguity depending on the extent of access costs. 
In Chapter 5, I separately examine the effects of review ambiguity and access costs on processing as well as both 
acquisition and integration. 
15 In my experiment, ActiveCo is the better performing firm once investors adjust for MoveCorp’s transitory gain 
revealed in the review correspondence. Thus, with an increased ability to compare and evaluate the two firms, 
investors’ comparative investment judgments should improve and reflect greater willingness to invest in ActiveCo. 
16 Relatedly, other research shows that market participants positively value oversight from auditors because auditor 
review and assurance help to reduce information risk (e.g., Nelson, Price, and Rountree 2008; Minnis 2011; DeFond 
and Zhang 2014). While ambiguity is conceptually distinct from information risk, both may lead to similar 
predictions on the effects on investment judgments. 
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no-review outcome (Experiment 2). 
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CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENTAL METHOD  
4.1 PARTICIPANTS 
 Participants are 122 Masters in accountancy students enrolled in a financial statement 
analysis course at a large U.S. university. Participants have taken on average 11 accounting 
courses and 3 finance courses. I use Masters students to match participants’ knowledge to my 
task (Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson 2002). In the task, participants evaluate financial 
information, compute financial ratios, and provide investment-related judgments. The Masters 
students are familiar with evaluating firms’ financial statements and other financial information, 
computing financial ratios, and comparing firms’ financial reports and, thus, are an appropriate 
proxy for nonprofessional investors.  
 
4.2 DESIGN  
 To test my predictions, I conduct Experiment 1 with a 2 × 2 between-subjects design, 
with review ambiguity (high or low) and access costs (high or low) as my manipulated 
variables.17 Participants evaluate two firms within the exercise apparel industry (ActiveCo and 
MoveCorp) as potential investments. All participants receive the same financial reports for each 
firm, which include background information, financial highlights, financial statements, and notes 
to the financial statements. As detailed below, my two manipulations relate to the review 





17 I also examine an alternative operationalization for my Low Ambiguity condition in Experiment 2, as discussed in 
more detail in Chapters 4.4 and 5.3. 
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4.3 TASK AND PROCEDURES 
 I conduct my experiment in a computer lab using Qualtrics. Figure 2 presents a timeline 
with the tasks and procedures for each experimental session. After participants arrive at the 
computer lab for the experiment, a link randomly assigns them to one of the experimental 
conditions. I inform participants that they will have access to financial reports for both ActiveCo 
and MoveCorp and may receive review correspondence between the Regulator and each firm.  
 Using a ratio computation task similar to Hodge et al. (2004) and Elliott, Hodge, 
Kennedy, and Pronk (2007), I instruct participants on three financial ratios that industry experts 
believe are critical to firms in the industry. The ratios are return on assets (net income / total 
assets), operating profit margin (operating income / net revenue), and SG&A productivity (net 
revenue / SG&A expenses). I inform participants that they should develop their best estimates of 
each of the ratio inputs, which should reflect recurring amounts. Participants then respond to 
three comprehension check questions to ensure they understand the task before proceeding to the 
firms’ financial reports.  
 Based on the amounts reported in the firms’ financial statements, MoveCorp’s three 
financial ratios all appear to be better than ActiveCo’s. Thus, if participants do not adjust the 
reported numbers, MoveCorp appears to be the better investment. However, MoveCorp’s review 
correspondence reveals that MoveCorp’s SG&A expenses include a one-time gain of 
approximately $30 million from the sale of production assets (see Appendix B, Panel E).18 If 
participants adjust MoveCorp’s reported SG&A expenses for the one-time gain, then ActiveCo 
appears to be the better performing firm.  
																																																								
18 My use of a transitory gain from asset sales in SG&A expenses is motivated by practice (McVay 2006). Other 
studies use similar transitory items to examine information processing effects (e.g., Brown, Grant, and Winn 2018; 
Grant 2018).  
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4.4 REVIEW AMBIGUITY MANIPULATION 
I manipulate review ambiguity by varying how transparent the Regulator is regarding the 
outcomes from its review process, including for ActiveCo (see Appendix B, Panels A and B). 
There are three possible outcomes for each firm: review with comments, review without 
comments, or no review. First, before viewing any review correspondence, I inform participants 
either that the Regulator issues a review letter only when the Regulator reviews a firm’s financial 
report and has comments, consistent with current SEC practice (High Ambiguity) or for all three 
possible outcomes (Low Ambiguity). Second, if participants choose to view the review 
correspondence in the High Ambiguity condition, they learn that the Regulator did not issue a 
review letter for ActiveCo’s FY 2017 Financial Report, and I remind participants that it is 
therefore uncertain if (1) the Regulator did not review ActiveCo’s financial report or (2) the 
Regulator reviewed ActiveCo’s financial report and had no comments. If participants choose to 
view the review correspondence in the Low Ambiguity condition, ActiveCo’s review letter from 
the Regulator states, “We reviewed your FY 2017 Financial Report and have no comments on 
your report.” Compound manipulations like this are common in experimental research when two 
aspects of a construct vary in the natural setting (Kadous et al. 2003; Kadous et al. 2013; Bol and 
Leiby 2018). In Experiment 2, I present participants with an alternative Low Ambiguity 
operationalization, where the Regulator states that it did not review ActiveCo’s financial report. 
MoveCorp’s review correspondence revealing the one-time gain is the same in all conditions. 
 
4.5 ACCESS COST MANIPULATION 
I manipulate access costs by varying the amount of effort required to access any review 
correspondence. In the High Cost condition, participants must correctly answer 15 simple 
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algebra problems (addition, subtraction, and multiplication) before they can view each firm’s 
review correspondence (recall that the review correspondence available to participants for 
ActiveCo depends on my review ambiguity manipulation). In the Low Cost condition, 
participants can view each firm’s review correspondence without answering any algebra 
problems. Thus, participants must exert more effort to access the review correspondence in the 
High Cost condition than in the Low Cost condition. My manipulation of access costs is 
consistent with prior psychology studies that operationalize access costs in an abstract manner 
(e.g., Urbany 1986; Smith et al. 1999; Morgan and Patrick 2013). Finally, in both conditions, 
participants can also proceed without viewing any review correspondence. I chose not to force 
participants to view the review correspondence information to minimize interference with their 
natural processing of information. Forced viewing also raises potential concerns about an 
experimental demand effect (Hodge et al. 2004). I address potential concerns about self-selection 
effects in Chapter 5.2.2 below.  
 
4.6 INFORMATION PROCESSING  
I measure information processing by examining whether or not participants adjust 
MoveCorp’s SG&A expenses when calculating MoveCorp’s SG&A productivity ratio. If 
participants process the review correspondence information, they should make a corresponding 
adjustment to MoveCorp’s SG&A expenses to account for the one-time gain. I also measure the 
magnitude of participants’ adjustments to MoveCorp’s SG&A expenses, where larger 
adjustments reflect increased information processing.  
I also measure each component of information processing. I measure acquisition through 
whether or not participants view the review correspondence. I measure integration through 
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whether or not participants adjust MoveCorp’s SG&A expenses, conditional on viewing 
MoveCorp’s review correspondence. 
 
4.7 COMPARATIVE INVESTMENT JUDGMENTS   
I measure participants’ comparative investment judgments through their relative 
willingness to invest in the firms. I ask participants, “How attractive is an investment 
in ActiveCo [MoveCorp] stock as part of your diversified portfolio?” Participants respond for 
each firm on a 101-point scale from 0 (“Very unattractive”) to 100 (“Very attractive”). I also ask 
participants, “How likely are you to invest in ActiveCo [MoveCorp] stock as part of your 
diversified portfolio?” Participants respond for each firm on a 101-point scale from 0 (“Very 
unlikely”) to 100 (“Very likely”). Willingness to invest is the average of these two measures. I 
measure relative willingness to invest by computing the difference between participants’ 
willingness to invest in ActiveCo and MoveCorp, where positive (negative) values indicate 
greater willingness to invest in ActiveCo (MoveCorp).  
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
5.1 MANIPULATION CHECKS 
 I assess the effectiveness of my review ambiguity manipulation by asking participants, 
“How certain are you about the outcome of the Regulator’s review of ActiveCo’s FY 2017 
Financial Report?” Participants respond on a 101-point scale with endpoints 0 (“Very uncertain”) 
and 100 (“Very certain”). Participants in the Low Ambiguity condition are more certain about the 
outcome from the Regulator’s review than participants in the High Ambiguity condition (mean of 
64.03 > 55.39; t = 2.18; p = 0.02, one-tailed).19 I assess the effectiveness of my access cost 
manipulation by asking participants, “How much effort was required to access the Review 
Correspondence from the Regulator?” Participants respond on a 101-point scale with endpoints 0 
(“Very little effort”) and 100 (“A lot of effort”). Participants in the High Cost condition believe 
that more effort was required to access the review correspondence than participants in the Low 
Cost condition (mean of 56.10 > 42.20; t= 3.00; p < 0.01, one-tailed). Collectively, these results 
suggest that my manipulations of review ambiguity and access costs were successful. 
 
5.2 TESTS OF HYPOTHESES  
5.2.1 The effect of review ambiguity and access costs on information processing (Test of H1)  
 H1 predicts that the effect of review ambiguity on investors’ processing of review 
correspondence information will strengthen as access costs decrease. My primary measure of 
information processing is whether or not participants adjust MoveCorp’s SG&A expenses. If 
																																																								
19 All p-values are two-tailed, unless specified otherwise. I also ask participants how certain they are about the 
outcome from the Regulator’s review of MoveCorp’s FY 2017 Financial Report, which should not vary between 
conditions because all participants have access to the same review correspondence for MoveCorp. Consistent with 
this, I find no differences in participants’ certainty about MoveCorp between the High Ambiguity and Low 
Ambiguity conditions (64.21 » 64.89; t = 0.19; p = 0.85).  
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participants process the review correspondence information, they should make a corresponding 
adjustment to MoveCorp’s SG&A expenses for the transitory gain. 
 Table 1, Panel A reports the percentages and proportions of participants that adjust 
MoveCorp’s SG&A expenses by condition. Figure 3, Panel A displays the cell means for the 
percentage of participants adjusting SG&A expenses by condition. To test H1, I use the 
following general linear model with a logit link:  
"#$%&' = 	*+ + *-"./01%0'2 + *345&' + *6"./01%0'2 × 45&' + 7 
The dependent variable, Adjust, equals 1 if a participant adjusts MoveCorp’s SG&A expenses 
and equals 0 otherwise. The independent variables, Ambiguity and Cost, are indicators for my 
review ambiguity and access cost conditions. The model also includes the interaction between 
the Ambiguity and Cost variables.  
Table 1, Panel B presents results from the general linear model, which reveals an 
interaction of review ambiguity and access costs on information processing (p = 0.06). Table 1, 
Panel C reports follow-up tests using Fisher’s Exact Test. When access costs are relatively low, 
participants’ information processing increases with lower review ambiguity (p = 0.04, one-
tailed). In contrast, when access costs are relatively high, participants’ information processing 
does not vary with review ambiguity (p = 0.61).  
I also examine participants’ information processing by measuring the magnitude of 
participants’ adjustments to MoveCorp’s SG&A expenses.20 Larger adjustments to MoveCorp’s 
SG&A expenses reflect greater processing of MoveCorp’s review correspondence information.21 
																																																								
20 Using SG&A adjustment amounts as my dependent variable violates the assumption of normality for the two-way 
ANOVA. Thus, I present SG&A adjustment amounts as my secondary measure of information processing. 
However, research indicates that ANOVAs are generally robust to violations of normality (Maxwell and Delaney 
2004). Further, because results are inferentially similar between my two measures of information processing, 
violation of the normality assumption seems to have a limited effect on the interpretability of my results.  
21 I use the magnitude of participants’ adjustments, rather than the signed adjustments, because some participants 
correctly adjust MoveCorp’s SG&A expenses but do so in the wrong direction (i.e., decreasing rather than 
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Table 2 reports results for my secondary information processing measure, which are inferentially 
similar to results for my primary measure discussed above. 
Consistent with H1, these results show that review ambiguity and access costs have an 
interactive effect on investors’ processing of review correspondence information. Specifically, 
investors process review correspondence information to a greater extent as review ambiguity 
decreases, but only when access costs are relatively low. Importantly, these results suggest that, 
rather than improving processing of review correspondence, reducing access costs may actually 
have harmful effects on investors’ processing, unless accompanied by lower review ambiguity. 
 
5.2.2 Acquisition, integration, and self-selection analysis 
To provide further insights into investors’ information processing, I also separately 
examine the joint effects of review ambiguity and access costs on investors’ acquisition and 
integration of review correspondence information. I measure acquisition through whether or not 
participants view MoveCorp’s review correspondence. Consistent with expectations, results 
(untabulated) reveal a significant main effect of access costs on acquisition of review 
correspondence information, with acquisition higher when access costs are relatively low versus 
relatively high (96.7% > 62.3%; c2 (1; n = 122) = 14.16; p < 0.01). However, there is no 
interaction of review ambiguity and access costs on acquisition (c2 (1; n = 122) = 0.02; p = 0.88).  
I measure integration through whether or not participants adjust MoveCorp’s SG&A 
expenses, conditional on viewing MoveCorp’s review correspondence. Table 3, Panel A reports 
the percentages and proportions of participants that adjust MoveCorp’s SG&A expenses by 
																																																								
increasing their estimates of SG&A expenses). I presume that the incorrect sign of the adjustments is in error and 
attributable to confusion about adjusting an expense line item for a gain. Results are inferentially similar when I 
exclude participants that adjust MoveCorp’s SG&A expenses in the wrong direction.  
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condition. Figure 3, Panel C displays the cell means for the percentage of participants adjusting 
SG&A expenses by condition. Table 3, Panel B presents results from the same general linear 
model used to test H1, which reveals an interaction of review ambiguity and access costs on 
information integration (p = 0.10). The standard ANOVA interaction (+1, -1, +1, -1) is the most 
appropriate interaction contrast for my information processing and willingness to invest 
measures. However, it is a relatively weak test for integration, where theory supports a more 
specific choice of contrast weights (Buckless and Ravenscroft 1990; Guggenmos, Piercey, and 
Agoglia 2018). Specifically, the theory underlying H1 suggests investors’ integration of review 
correspondence information will increase when access costs are relatively high or when review 
ambiguity is relatively low, and integration will be lowest when access costs are relatively low 
and review ambiguity is relatively high. Thus, I also examine the interaction of review ambiguity 
and access costs on investors’ integration using contrast weights of -3 for the High Ambiguity / 
Low Cost condition and +1 for each of the other three conditions (Low Ambiguity / Low Cost, 
High Ambiguity / High Cost, and Low Ambiguity / High Cost). Table 3, Panel C presents results 
from the planned contrast, which are statistically significant (p < 0.01).22  
Finally, Table 3, Panel D reports follow-up tests using Fisher’s Exact Test. When access 
costs are relatively low, participants’ information integration increases with lower review 
ambiguity (p = 0.04, one-tailed). In contrast, when access costs are relatively high, participants’ 
information integration does not vary with review ambiguity (p = 0.73).  
Because I observe a main effect of access costs on acquisition, one potential concern is 
that participants acquiring MoveCorp’s review correspondence in the High Cost conditions may 
																																																								
22 Visual fit is confirmed with the plot of cell means in Figure 3, Panel C. An approximation of a semiomnibus test 
confirms that residual between-cells variance is insignificant after accounting for the planned contrast (F2,93 = 0.29; 
p = 0.75), and only 7.1% of the between-cells variance is not explained by the contrast (Guggenmos et al. 2018). 
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be different (e.g., more motivated, knowledgeable, etc.) from those acquiring MoveCorp’s 
review correspondence in the Low Cost conditions and these differences, rather than my 
manipulations, may be driving my results. To address this self-selection concern, I examine 
whether participants viewing MoveCorp’s review correspondence differ across a variety of 
demographic and performance measures (Hodge et al. 2004), including financial expertise, risk 
preferences, and other demographic variables.23 None of the demographic or performance 
measures differs across my four conditions or between my High Cost and Low Cost conditions. 
In addition, I measure the time spent on the task (excluding time spent on the review 
correspondence screen) and use this measure as a proxy for motivation. Again, the motivation 
measure does not differ across my four conditions or between my High Cost and Low Cost 
conditions. This additional analysis helps mitigate concerns than self-selection is driving my 
results, rather than my manipulations.  
 
5.2.3 The effect of review ambiguity and access costs on investment judgments (Test of H2)  
H2 predicts that, as access costs decrease, investors’ comparative investment judgments 
will reflect review correspondence information to a greater extent as review ambiguity decreases. 
I measure investors’ comparative investment judgments through participants’ relative 
willingness to invest. Willingness to invest for each firm is equal to the average of participants’ 
ratings of (1) the attractiveness of an investment in the firm and (2) the likelihood that they 
would invest in the firm.24 Relative willingness to invest is the difference in participants’ 
willingness to invest in ActiveCo and MoveCorp. In my experiment, ActiveCo is the better 
																																																								
23 Demographic variables include annual report familiarity, SEC familiarity, financial statement analysis experience, 
investment experience, accounting courses taken, and finance courses taken. 
24 The Cronbach’s alphas for my willingness to invest measures are 0.83 (ActiveCo) and 0.93 (MoveCorp), which 
suggests they are capturing the same willingness to invest construct. 
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performing firm once SG&A expenses are adjusted for MoveCorp’s transitory gain. Positive 
(negative) values correspond to greater willingness to invest in ActiveCo (MoveCorp) and, thus, 
investors’ comparative investment judgments reflecting the review correspondence information 
to a greater (lesser) extent.  
 Table 4, Panel A reports means, standard errors, and cell sizes for my relative willingness 
to invest measures by condition. Figure 4 displays the cell means of relative willingness to invest 
by condition. Table 4, Panel B reports results from a two-way ANOVA with relative willingness 
to invest as the dependent variable and the main and interactive effects of review ambiguity and 
access costs as independent variables. Consistent with H2, results show that review ambiguity 
and access costs have an interactive effect on relative willingness to invest judgments (p = 0.07).  
Table 4, Panel C reports follow-up simple effects tests. When access costs are relatively 
low, relative willingness to invest increases as review ambiguity decreases (p = 0.03, one-tailed). 
In contrast, when access costs are relatively high, relative willingness to invest does not vary 
between review ambiguity conditions (p = 0.42). Consistent with H2, these results show that, as 
access costs decrease, investors’ comparative investment judgments reflect review 
correspondence information to a greater extent as review ambiguity decreases. Further, investors 
are better able to evaluate and compare firms, leading to higher quality judgments. 
 
5.2.4 Process evidence: The indirect effect of review correspondence information processing on 
investors’ comparative investment judgments  
 Results for H2 are consistent with increased processing of review correspondence 
information improving investors’ comparative investment judgments. To provide further 
evidence on the underlying process, I perform a moderated mediation path analysis. Figure 5 
 33 
presents the moderated mediation path model, using review ambiguity as my predictor (+1 for 
Low Ambiguity and -1 for High Ambiguity), access costs as my moderator (+1 for High Cost and 
-1 for Low Cost), and relative willingness to invest as my dependent variable. My mediating 
variable is information processing, which is the magnitude of participants’ adjustments to SG&A 
expenses.25 Consistent with review correspondence allowing investors to better evaluate and 
compare investment alternatives, I expect an indirect effect of review ambiguity on relative 
willingness to invest via information processing when access costs are relatively low but not 
when access costs are relatively high.  
 To test for conditional indirect effects, I construct 95% bias-corrected confidence 
intervals with 5,000 bootstrapped resamples of data with replacement (Hayes 2013).  A 
statistically significant indirect effect requires that zero not appear within the confidence interval. 
Figure 5, Panel A presents results for the High Cost condition, which reveals that the conditional 
indirect effect is not significant (95% bias-corrected confidence interval: (-2.29, 1.08)).26 Figure 
5, Panel B presents results for the Low Cost condition, which reveals that the conditional indirect 
effect is significant (95% bias-corrected confidence interval: (0.19, 4.47)). The difference 
between the two conditions is also significant (95% bias-corrected confidence interval: (-5.58,  
-0.14)). Finally, neither of the conditional direct effects of review ambiguity on relative 
willingness to invest is significant (both p > 0.10). Collectively, these results show that investors’ 
processing of review correspondence mediates the joint effects of review ambiguity and access 
costs on investors’ relative willingness to invest, providing further support for H2. 
 
																																																								
25 Moderated mediation path analysis in PROCESS (Hayes 2013) requires a continuous variable for the mediator. 
Thus, I use the magnitude of participants’ adjustments to SG&A expenses for mediation purposes.  
26 For visual simplicity, I present results for the High Cost and Low Cost conditions in separate panels of Figure 5. 
However, the models are run simultaneously using the PROCESS macro in SPSS (Hayes 2013). 
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5.2.5 Supplemental analysis 
 To provide additional insights, I also examine how review ambiguity and access costs 
jointly influence investors’ judgments regarding reporting quality, confidence, financial 
performance, and management credibility. 
 
5.2.5.1 Reporting quality judgments 
First, I examine how review ambiguity and access costs influence investors’ perceptions 
of financial reporting quality—specifically, how faithfully represented financial information is in 
the firms’ financial reports. Greater processing of the review correspondence should lead 
participants to view ActiveCo as the higher quality reporter. Consistent with the FASB’s 
definition of faithful representation (FASB 2010), I inform participants, “Financial information 
is faithfully represented in a financial report when the information is complete, neutral, and free 
from error.” I then ask participants, “How faithfully represented is the financial information in 
ActiveCo’s [MoveCorp’s] FY 2017 Financial Report?” Participants respond for each firm on a 
101-point scale from 0 (“Very low”) to 100 (“Very high”). I measure relative reporting quality 
judgments by calculating the difference between participants’ responses for ActiveCo and 
MoveCorp. Positive (negative) values correspond to perceptions that ActiveCo’s (MoveCorp’s) 
financial information is more faithfully represented.  
Results (untabulated) reveal that review ambiguity and access costs have an interactive 
effect on investors’ reporting quality judgments. The two-way ANOVA interaction of review 
ambiguity and access costs on relative reporting quality judgments is significant (F1,118 = 8.88; p 
< 0.01). Follow-up simple effects tests are also consistent with expectations. When access costs 
are relatively low, relative reporting quality judgments increase with lower review ambiguity (t = 
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3.40; p < 0.01, one-tailed). In contrast, when access costs are relatively high, review ambiguity 
has no effect on relative reporting quality judgments (t = 0.81; p = 0.42).  
 
5.2.5.2 Confidence in investment evaluations 
I also examine the interactive effects of review ambiguity and access costs on investors’ 
confidence in their investment evaluations. The FASB suggests that greater financial reporting 
knowledge should increase investors’ confidence when making investment judgments (FASB 
2010). I measure confidence by asking participants, “How confident are you in your ability to 
evaluate ActiveCo [MoveCorp] as a potential investment?” Participants respond for each firm on 
a 101-point scale from 0 (“Not at all confident”) to 100 (“Very confident”). Relative confidence 
is the difference in participants’ confidence in their evaluations of ActiveCo and MoveCorp. 
Positive (negative) values correspond to higher confidence in evaluations of ActiveCo 
(MoveCorp). 
Results (untabulated) reveal that review ambiguity and access costs have an interactive 
effect on investors’ confidence in their investment evaluations. The two-way ANOVA 
interaction of review ambiguity and access costs on relative confidence judgments is significant 
(F1,118 = 18.57; p < 0.01). Follow-up simple effects tests are also consistent with expectations. 
When access costs are relatively low, relative confidence increases with lower review ambiguity 
(t = 4.56; p < 0.01, one-tailed). In contrast, when access costs are relatively high, review 
ambiguity has no effect on relative confidence (t = 1.53; p = 0.13). 
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5.2.5.3 Financial performance judgments  
 I also examine participants’ relative financial performance judgments. As with relative 
willingness to invest, greater processing of review correspondence information should lead 
participants to view ActiveCo as the better performing firm. I ask participants, “How would you 
rate the financial performance of ActiveCo [MoveCorp] for FY 2017?” Participants respond for 
each firm on a 101-point scale from 0 (“Very weak”) to 100 (“Very strong”). I measure relative 
financial performance by calculating the difference between participants’ financial performance 
judgments for ActiveCo and MoveCorp. Positive (negative) values correspond to higher 
perceived financial performance for ActiveCo (MoveCorp).  
Results (untabulated) reveal that review ambiguity and access costs jointly influence 
relative financial performance judgments. Specifically, the two-way ANOVA interaction of 
review ambiguity and access costs on relative financial performance is significant (F1,118 = 3.42; 
p = 0.07). Follow-up simple effects tests are also consistent with expectations. When access costs 
are relatively low, participants’ relative financial performance judgments increase with lower 
review ambiguity (t = 1.76; p = 0.04, one-tailed). However, when access costs are relatively 
high, participants’ relative financial performance judgments do not vary with review ambiguity  
(t = 0.85; p = 0.40).  
 
5.2.5.4 Management credibility judgments  
Finally, I examine participants’ perceptions of management credibility. Greater 
processing of the review correspondence should lead participants to view MoveCorp’s 
management as relatively less credible, since MoveCorp did not provide details on the transitory 
gain in its FY 2017 Financial Report. I measure credibility by asking participants about the 
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competence and trustworthiness of each firm’s management. Specifically, I ask participants, 
“How competent is the management of ActiveCo [MoveCorp]?” Participants respond for each 
firm on a 101-point scale from 0 (“Not at all competent”) to 100 (“Very competent”). I also ask 
participants, “How trustworthy is the management of ActiveCo [MoveCorp]?” Participants 
respond for each firm on a 101-point scale from 0 (“Not at all trustworthy”) to 100 (“Very 
trustworthy”). Credibility is the average of these two measures. The Cronbach’s alphas for my 
credibility measures is 0.90 (ActiveCo) and 0.76 (MoveCorp), suggesting they are capturing the 
same underlying construct. I measure relative credibility by calculating the difference between 
participants’ credibility judgments for ActiveCo and MoveCorp. Positive (negative) values 
correspond to perceptions that ActiveCo’s (MoveCorp’s) management is more credible.  
Results (untabulated) reveal that review ambiguity and access costs jointly influence 
relative credibility judgments. Specifically, the two-way ANOVA interaction of review 
ambiguity and access costs on relative credibility judgments is significant (F1,118 = 6.08;  
p = 0.02). Follow-up simple effects tests are also consistent with expectations. When access costs 
are relatively low, participants’ relative credibility judgments increase with lower review 
ambiguity (t = 2.31; p = 0.01, one-tailed). However, when access costs are relatively high, 
participants’ relative credibility judgments do not vary with review ambiguity (t = 1.17;  
p = 0.24).  
 
5.3 EXPERIMENT 2: ALTERNATIVE LOW AMBIGUITY OPERATIONALIZATION 
 Experiment 2 uses an alternative operationalization for the Low Ambiguity condition, 
which is identical to the operationalization in Experiment 1 except for ActiveCo’s review letter. 
Rather than the review letter stating that the Regulator reviewed and had no comments on 
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ActiveCo’s financial report, ActiveCo’s review letter states, “We did not review your FY 2017 
Financial Report.” All other experimental materials are identical to Experiment 1.  
The purpose of my alternative operationalization is to provide corroborating evidence on 
the effects of reducing review ambiguity on investors’ processing and investment judgments. As 
previously noted, my manipulation of review ambiguity is a compound manipulation of overall 
review ambiguity and ActiveCo’s review outcome. The Low Ambiguity operationalization in  
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 reduces overall review ambiguity for investors. The only 
difference between the two operationalizations is the nature of ActiveCo’s review outcome (no 
comments or no review, respectively). Importantly, ActiveCo’s financial information, used in 
calculating ActiveCo’s financial ratios, is constant across conditions. However, it is plausible 
investors may perceive ActiveCo’s no-comments review outcome in Experiment 1 as a positive 
signal about ActiveCo. Thus, I use the alternative Low Ambiguity operationalization in 
Experiment 2 to confirm that overall review ambiguity is driving the results in Experiment 1, 
rather than the potential positive signal about ActiveCo.  
I use an additional 60 Masters students enrolled in the same financial statement analysis 
course as participants in Experiment 1. Participants are randomly assigned to one of two access 
cost conditions, High Cost or Low Cost. I then reexamine H1 and H2 with my alternative Low 
Ambiguity operationalization.27 
Table 5, Panel A reports the percentages and proportions of investors adjusting 
MoveCorp’s SG&A expenses in each condition. Figure 6, Panel A presents cell means by 
																																																								
27 For purposes of reexamining H1 and H2, I use the same High Ambiguity conditions from Experiment 1. Because 
my alternative Low Ambiguity conditions were conducted after Experiment 1, participants were not randomly 
assigned among these four experimental conditions. Thus, these results only partially reflect a 2 × 2 between-
subjects design. However, participants were randomly assigned between the two alternative Low Ambiguity 
conditions (High Cost and Low Cost). 
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condition. Table 5, Panel B presents results from the general linear model with a logit link, 
which reveals an interactive effect of review ambiguity and access costs on information 
processing (p = 0.08). Table 5, Panel C presents follow-up tests using Fisher’s Exact Test. 
Consistent with H1, when access costs are relatively low, participants’ processing of review 
correspondence information increases with lower review ambiguity (p = 0.03, one-tailed). In 
contrast, when access costs are relatively high, participants’ processing of review 
correspondence information does not vary with review ambiguity (p = 0.80).  
 Table 6 reports results for investors’ integration of review correspondence information 
for Experiment 2, which are similar to Experiment 1. Specifically, Table 6, Panel C presents 
results from the planned contrast using the same contrast weights as in Experiment 1. The 
planned contrast is statistically significant (p < 0.01).28 Table 6, Panel D presents follow-up tests 
using Fisher’s Exact Test. When access costs are relatively low, participants integrate review 
correspondence information to a greater extent as review ambiguity decreases (p = 0.04, one-
tailed). However, review ambiguity has no effect on integration when access costs are relatively 
high (p = 1.00). Collectively, these results provide corroborating evidence that the information 
processing effects observed in both experiments are driven by a reduction in overall review 
ambiguity. 
While results for H1 are inferentially similar to Experiment 1, results for H2 differ with 
my alternative Low Ambiguity operationalization and indicate that investors’ comparative 
investment judgments depend not only on overall review ambiguity but also the nature of 
ActiveCo’s review outcome. Table 7, Panel A reports means, standard errors, and cell sizes for 
																																																								
28 Visual fit is confirmed with the plot of cell means in Figure 6, Panel B. An approximation of a semiomnibus test 
confirms that residual between-cells variance is insignificant after accounting for the planned contrast (F2,90 = 0.24; 
p = 0.79), and only 5.6% of the between-cells variance is not explained by the contrast (Guggenmos et al. 2018). 
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relative willingness to invest judgments by condition. Figure 6, Panel C presents cell means by 
condition. Table 7, Panel B reports results from my two-way ANOVA. Results show that review 
ambiguity and access costs have an interactive effect on relative willingness to invest (p < 0.01), 
but in a different manner than in Experiment 1. Table 7, Panel C reports follow-up simple effects 
tests, which differ in important ways from my primary results for H2. Specifically, when access 
costs are relatively low, review ambiguity has no effect on investors’ relative willingness to 
invest judgments (p = 0.12, one-tailed). In contrast, when access costs are relatively high, 
relative willingness to invest judgments are significantly greater when review ambiguity is 
higher versus lower (p = 0.01).  
Further analysis (untabulated) reveals that the different results for H2 with the alternative 
Low Ambiguity operationalization are attributable to investors becoming relatively less willing to 
invest in ActiveCo when the Regulator reveals a no-review outcome, rather than a no-comments 
outcome (mean relative willingness to invest -3.14 < 2.11; t = 2.01; p = 0.05). Recall that 
ActiveCo’s financial information, which is the only information needed to calculate ActiveCo’s 
financial ratios, is constant across conditions. Nevertheless, investors become less willing to 
invest in ActiveCo once the Regulator reveals that it did not review ActiveCo’s financial report. 
This result is consistent with disclosure of ActiveCo’s no-review outcome increasing perceived 
ambiguity about ActiveCo as a firm. Thus, consistent with ambiguity aversion literature (e.g., 
Ellsberg 1961; Camerer and Weber 1992), investors appear to respond to the no-review outcome 
by choosing to avoid investing in ActiveCo. In sum, Experiment 2 results indicate that investors’ 
information processing depends only on a reduction in overall review ambiguity. In contrast, 
investors’ comparative investment judgments also depend on the nature of the revealed outcome, 
highlighting a potential cost to reducing ambiguity about no-review outcomes.   
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 In this study, I examine how two informational characteristics of SEC review 
correspondence—review ambiguity and access costs—jointly influence investors’ information 
processing and investment judgments. Results show that investors integrate information to a 
greater extent as review ambiguity decreases, but only when access costs are relatively low. 
Experiment 2 results confirm these findings and suggest that the information processing effects 
result from a reduction in overall review ambiguity. In contrast, results from my two experiments 
suggest that the effects on investors’ comparative investment judgments also depend on the 
nature of ActiveCo’s review outcome (no comments or no review).  
 My study has several limitations that provide opportunities for further research. First, I 
focus on ambiguity in the information environment arising from the SEC’s lack of transparency 
about review outcomes. However, there are a variety of other sources of ambiguity for investors 
with review correspondence (e.g., firm selection, depth of review, etc.) and financial information 
more generally (Williams 2015). Future research can examine how these other sources of 
ambiguity may differentially influence investors. Second, it is possible that investors may 
interpret “no comment” letters as an implicit endorsement of the firm’s reporting and then might 
be less scrupulous when analyzing firm financial information. Future research can examine 
whether reducing review ambiguity in these circumstances may impair investors’ processing of 
firm financial information. Finally, I focus on a setting in which both firm financial reports and 
review correspondence are available to investors before they make their investment judgments. 
However, in practice, investors may encounter review correspondence for different firms at 
different times, including after making investment decisions or on a prospective basis. Future 
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research can examine how investors’ processing and judgments may differ in these other 
investment evaluation settings.  
 Overall, my study contributes to prior literature and practice in several important ways. I 
contribute to research on reporting quality indicators and SEC review correspondence (e.g., 
Dechow et al. 2016; Johnston and Petacchi 2017; Ryans 2018), ambiguity (e.g., Zimbelman and 
Waller 1999; Williams 2015; Winchel 2015; White 2017), and access costs and effort (e.g., 
Nelson and Tayler 2007; Smith et al. 2016; Grant 2018). Further, from a practical perspective, 
my results underscore the significance of evaluating informational characteristics jointly rather 
than independently, which is important for regulators and other standard-setters as they explore 
ways to increase the accessibility and usefulness of information for investors. 
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
 






Figure 2: Experimental Timeline  
 
																																																								
Figure 2 graphically depicts the timeline of my experimental sessions. 
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Figure 3: Observed Effects of Review Ambiguity and Access Costs on Information Processing 
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Figure 3 (continued)   
 







Figure 3 graphically depicts my observed mean values for investors’ information processing. Panel A presents 
results for information processing based on the percentage of investors adjusting SG&A expenses, and Panel B 
presents results for information processing based on SG&A expense adjustment amounts. Panel C presents results  
for information integration based on the percentage of investors adjusting SG&A expenses, conditional on viewing  
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Figure 4: Observed Effects of Review Ambiguity and Access Costs on Relative Willingness to 





Figure 4 graphically depicts my observed mean values for investors’ relative willingness to invest judgments for H2. 
Relative willingness to invest is the difference in willingness to invest in ActiveCo and MoveCorp. Positive 
(negative) values correspond to greater relative willingness to invest in ActiveCo (MoveCorp). See Table 4 for 
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Figure 5: Moderated Mediation Path Analysis: The Effects of Review Ambiguity (Conditional 
on Access Costs) on Relative Willingness to Invest Via Information Processing   
 








Figure 5 graphically depicts my moderated mediation path analysis. For visual simplicity, I present results separately 
for the High Cost and Low Cost conditions, even though the model is calculated simultaneously for all conditions 
using the PROCESS macro in SPSS (Hayes 2013). The review ambiguity variable equals -1 (1) for the High 
Ambiguity (Low Ambiguity) condition. The access cost variable equals -1 (1) for the Low Cost (High Cost) 
condition. Information processing is the magnitude of the adjustment to MoveCorp’s SG&A expenses, and relative 
willingness to invest is the difference between an investor’s willingness to invest in ActiveCo and MoveCorp. To 
test for indirect effects, I construct 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals for the product of paths a and b. I use 
5,000 bootstrapped resamples of data with replacement (Hayes 2013). A statistically significant indirect effect 
requires that zero not appear within the confidence interval. Path c’ reflects the direct effect of review ambiguity on 
relative willingness to invest, while path c reflects the total effect (indirect effects plus direct effects).  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
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Figure 6: Observed Effects of Review Ambiguity (Alternative Operationalization) and Access 
Costs on Information Processing and Relative Willingness to Invest 
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Figure 6 (continued)   
 




Figure 6 graphically depicts my observed mean values for investors’ information processing for H1, information 
integration, and comparative investment judgments for H2, using my alternative Low Ambiguity manipulation. Panel 
A presents results for information processing (whether or not participants adjust MoveCorp’s SG&A expenses). 
Panel B presents results for information integration (whether or not participants adjust MoveCorp’s SG&A 
expenses, conditional on viewing MoveCorp’s review correspondence). Panel C presents results for relative 
willingness to invest (the difference in willingness to invest in ActiveCo and MoveCorp, where positive (negative) 
values correspond to greater relative willingness to invest in ActiveCo (MoveCorp)). See Tables 5–7 for descriptive 
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Table 1 
How Review Ambiguity and Access Costs Affect Information Processing (Percentage Adjusting SG&A 
Expenses) (H1) 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics—Percentage [Proportions] of Investors that Adjust MoveCorp’s SG&A 
Expenses  
  Access Costs   
     
Review Ambiguity  High  Low  Row Means 
       
High  48% 
[15 / 31] 
 
 30% 
[9 / 30] 
 
 39% 
[24 / 61] 
Low  40% 
[12 / 30] 
 
 55% 
[17 / 31] 
 
 48% 
[29 / 61] 
Column Means  44% 
[27 / 61] 
 43% 
[26 / 61] 
 43% 
[53 / 122] 
Panel B: General Linear Model (Logit Link) Results —Adjustments to SG&A Expenses  
!"#$%& = 	)* + ),!-./0$/&1 + )234%& + )5!-./0$/&1 × 34%& + 7 
Variable   df   c2  p 
         
Ambiguity   1      0.88    0.35 
Cost   1      0.06     0.81 
Ambiguity by Cost   1      3.43    0.06 
         
Panel C: Follow-Up Tests Using Fisher’s Exact Test: Percentage Adjusting to SG&A Expenses  
  df  p 
     
Low Ambiguity / Low Cost > High Ambiguity / Low Cost  1  0.04* 
Low Ambiguity / High Cost vs. High Ambiguity / High Cost  1  0.61 
High Ambiguity / High Cost vs. High Ambiguity / Low Cost  1  0.19 
Low Ambiguity / High Cost vs. Low Ambiguity / Low Cost   1  0.31 








This table presents descriptive statistics, general linear model results, and follow-up tests using Fisher’s Exact Test for the 
percentage of participants that adjust MoveCorp’s SG&A expenses in each condition. I manipulate review ambiguity by 
varying how transparent the Regulator is regarding the outcomes from its review process. I manipulate access costs by 
varying the amount of effort required to access review correspondence. 




How Review Ambiguity and Access Costs Affect Information Processing (Magnitude of SG&A Expense 
Adjustments) (H1) 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics—Means [Standard Errors] for Adjustments to MoveCorp’s SG&A Expenses 
  Access Costs   
     
Review Ambiguity  High  Low  Row Means 
       
High  13.18 
[2.59] 








n = 61 
Low  10.27 
[2.89] 
n = 30 
 
  18.75 
[4.76] 




n = 61 
Column Means  11.75 
[2.76] 
n = 61 
 13.62 
[2.76] 
n = 61 
 12.69 
[1.68] 
n = 122 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) Results 
Source 
 Sum of 
Squares  df  
Mean 
Square  F  p 
           
Ambiguity  430.80  1  430.80  1.28  0.26 
Cost  100.49  1  100.49  0.30  0.59 
Ambiguity by Cost   1356.31  1  1356.31  4.03  0.05 
Error  39760.91  118  336.96     
 
Panel C: Follow-Up Simple Effects Tests 
  df  t  p 
       
Low Ambiguity / Low Cost > High Ambiguity / Low Cost  59  1.93  0.03* 
Low Ambiguity / High Cost vs. High Ambiguity / High Cost  59  0.75  0.46 
High Ambiguity / High Cost vs. High Ambiguity / Low Cost  59  1.36  0.18 








This table presents descriptive statistics, an ANOVA model, and follow-up simple effects tests for participants’ adjustment 
amounts for SG&A expenses. I manipulate review ambiguity by varying how transparent the Regulator is regarding the 
outcomes from its review process. I manipulate access costs by varying the amount of effort required to access review 
correspondence.  
*One-tailed equivalent given directional prediction (all other p-values are two-tailed).  
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Table 3 
How Review Ambiguity and Access Costs Affect Information Integration (Percentage Adjusting SG&A 
Expenses) 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics—Percentage [Proportions] of Investors that Adjust MoveCorp’s SG&A 
Expenses  
  Access Costs   
     
Review Ambiguity  High  Low  Row Means 
       
High  70% 
[14 / 20] 
 
 31% 
[9 / 29] 
 
 47% 
[23 / 49] 
Low  61% 
[11 / 18] 
 
 57% 
[17 / 30] 
 
 58% 
[28 / 48] 
Column Means  66% 
[25 / 38] 
 44% 
[26 / 59] 
 53% 
[51 / 97] 
Panel B: General Linear Model (Logit Link) Results —Adjustments to SG&A Expenses  
!"#$%& = 	)* + ),!-./0$/&1 + )234%& + )5!-./0$/&1 × 34%& + 7 
Variable   df   c2  p 
         
Ambiguity   1      0.59    0.44 
Cost   1      4.35     0.04 
Ambiguity by Cost   1      2.78    0.10 
         
Panel C: Planned Contrast: Weight of -3 for High Ambiguity / Low Cost and + 1 for Low Ambiguity / Low 
Cost, High Ambiguity / High Cost, and Low Ambiguity / High Cost 
   df   c2  p 
         
Contrast   1     7.63  < 0.01 
 
Panel D: Follow-Up Tests Using Fisher’s Exact Test: Percentage Adjusting to SG&A Expenses  
  df  p 
     
Low Ambiguity / Low Cost > High Ambiguity / Low Cost  1  0.04* 
Low Ambiguity / High Cost vs. High Ambiguity / High Cost  1  0.73 
High Ambiguity / High Cost vs. High Ambiguity / Low Cost  1  0.01 
Low Ambiguity / High Cost vs. Low Ambiguity / Low Cost   1  1.00 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics, general linear model results, planned contrast results, and follow-up tests using 
Fisher’s Exact Test for the percentage of participants that adjust MoveCorp’s SG&A expenses in each condition, 
conditional on participants viewing MoveCorp’s review correspondence. I manipulate review ambiguity by varying how 
transparent the Regulator is regarding the outcomes from its review process. I manipulate access costs by varying the 
amount of effort required to access review correspondence. An approximation of a semiomnibus test confirms that residual 
between-cells variance is not significant after accounting for the planned contrast in Panel C (F2,93 = 0.29; p = 0.75), and 
only 7.1% of the between-cells variance is not explained by the contrast (Guggenmos et al. 2018). 




How Review Ambiguity and Access Costs Affect Relative Willingness to Invest (H2) 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics—Means [Standard Errors] for Relative Willingness to Invest Judgments 
  Access Costs   
     
Review Ambiguity  High  Low  Row Means 
       
High  4.13 
[3.53] 








n = 61 
Low  0.25 
[3.19] 








n = 61 
Column Means  2.22 
[2.38] 
n = 61 
 0.35 
[1.97] 
n = 61 
 1.29 
[1.54] 
n = 122 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) Results 
Source 
 Sum of 
Squares  df  
Mean 
Square  F  p 
           
Ambiguity  85.08  1  85.08  0.30  0.59 
Cost  109.64  1  109.64  0.38  0.54 
Ambiguity by Cost   939.04  1  939.04  3.27  0.07 
Error  33870.31  118  287.04     
 
Panel C: Follow-Up Simple Effects Tests 
  df  t  p 
       
Low Ambiguity / Low Cost > High Ambiguity / Low Cost  59  1.87  0.03* 
Low Ambiguity / High Cost vs. High Ambiguity / High Cost  59  0.81  0.42 
High Ambiguity / High Cost vs. High Ambiguity / Low Cost  59  1.73  0.09 








This table presents descriptive statistics, an ANOVA model, and follow-up simple effects tests for participants’ relative 
willingness to invest judgments. Relative willingness to invest is the difference in a participant’s willingness to invest in 
ActiveCo and MoveCorp. I manipulate review ambiguity by varying how transparent the Regulator is regarding the 
outcomes from its review process. I manipulate access costs by varying the amount of effort required to access review 
correspondence.  
*One-tailed equivalent given directional prediction (all other p-values are two-tailed). 
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Table 5 
How Review Ambiguity and Access Costs Affect Information Processing (Alternative Low Ambiguity 
Operationalization) 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics—Percentage [Proportions] of Investors that Adjust MoveCorp’s SG&A 
Expenses 
  Access Costs   
     
Review Ambiguity  High  Low  Row Means 
       
High  48% 
[15 / 31] 
 
 30% 
[9 / 30] 
 
 39% 
[24 / 61] 
Low (Alternative)  44% 
[14 / 32] 
 
 57% 
[16 / 28] 
 
 50% 
[30 / 60] 
Column Means  46% 
[29 / 63] 
 43% 
[25 / 58] 
 45% 
[54 / 121] 
Panel B: General Linear Model (Logit Link) Results —Adjustments to SG&A Expenses  
!"#$%& = 	)* + ),!-./0$/&1 + )234%& + )5!-./0$/&1 × 34%& + 7 
Variable   df   c2  p 
         
Ambiguity   1      1.60  0.21 
Cost   1      0.11   0.74 
Ambiguity by Cost   1      3.12  0.08 
         
Panel C: Follow-Up Tests Using Fisher’s Exact Test: Percentage Adjusting SG&A Expenses  
  df  p 
     
Low Ambiguity (Alt) / Low Cost > High Ambiguity / Low Cost  1  0.03* 
Low Ambiguity (Alt) / High Cost vs. High Ambiguity / High Cost  1  0.80 
High Ambiguity / High Cost vs. High Ambiguity / Low Cost  1  0.19 








This table presents descriptive statistics, general linear model results, and follow-up tests using Fisher’s Exact Test for the 
percentage of participants that adjust MoveCorp’s SG&A expenses in each condition using my alternative Low Ambiguity 
operationalization. I manipulate review ambiguity by varying how transparent the Regulator is regarding the outcomes 
from its review process. I manipulate access costs by varying the amount of effort required to access review 
correspondence.  
*One-tailed equivalent given directional prediction (all other p-values are two-tailed). 
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Table 6 
How Review Ambiguity and Access Costs Affect Information Integration (Percentage Adjusting SG&A 
Expenses) (Alternative Low Ambiguity Operationalization) 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics—Percentage [Proportions] of Investors that Adjust MoveCorp’s SG&A 
Expenses  
  Access Costs   
     
Review Ambiguity  High  Low  Row Means 
       
High  70% 
[14 / 20] 
 
 31% 
[9 / 29] 
 
 47% 
[23 / 49] 
Low (Alternative)  65% 
[11 / 17] 
 
 57% 
[16 / 28] 
 
 60% 
[27 / 45] 
Column Means  68% 
[25 / 37] 
 44% 
[25 / 57] 
 53% 
[50 / 94] 
Panel B: General Linear Model (Logit Link) Results —Adjustments to SG&A Expenses  
!"#$%& = 	)* + ),!-./0$/&1 + )234%& + )5!-./0$/&1 × 34%& + 7 
Variable   df   c2  p 
         
Ambiguity   1      0.89    0.35 
Cost   1      4.81     0.03 
Ambiguity by Cost   1      2.20    0.14 
         
Panel C: Planned Contrast: Weight of -3 for High Ambiguity / Low Cost and + 1 for Low Ambiguity / Low 
Cost, High Ambiguity / High Cost, and Low Ambiguity / High Cost 
   df   c2  p 
         
Contrast   1     8.18  < 0.01 
 
Panel D: Follow-Up Tests Using Fisher’s Exact Test: Percentage Adjusting to SG&A Expenses  
  df  p 
     
Low Ambiguity (Alt.) / Low Cost > High Ambiguity / Low Cost  1  0.04* 
Low Ambiguity (Alt.) / High Cost vs. High Ambiguity / High Cost  1  1.00 
High Ambiguity / High Cost vs. High Ambiguity / Low Cost  1  0.01 
Low Ambiguity (Alt.) / High Cost vs. Low Ambiguity (Alt.) / Low Cost   1  0.76 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics, general linear model results, planned contrast results, and follow-up tests using 
Fisher’s Exact Test for the percentage of participants that adjust MoveCorp’s SG&A expenses, conditional on viewing 
MoveCorp’s review correspondence and using my alternative Low Ambiguity operationalization. I manipulate review 
ambiguity by varying how transparent the Regulator is regarding the outcomes from its review process. I manipulate access 
costs by varying the amount of effort required to access review correspondence. An approximation of a semiomnibus test 
confirms that residual between-cells variance is not significant after accounting for the planned contrast in Panel C (F2,90 
= 0.24; p = 0.79), and only 5.6% of the between-cells variance is not explained by the contrast (Guggenmos et al. 2018). 
*One-tailed equivalent given directional prediction (all other p-values are two-tailed). 
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Table 7 
How Review Ambiguity and Access Costs Affect Relative Willingness to Invest (Alternative Low Ambiguity 
Operationalization) 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics—Means [Standard Errors] for Relative Willingness to Invest Judgments 
  Access Costs   
     
Review Ambiguity  High  Low  Row Means 
       
High  4.13 
[3.53] 








n = 61 
Low (Alternative)  -6.11 
[2.05] 








n = 60 
Column Means  -1.07 
[2.11] 
n = 63 
 -1.60 
[1.52] 
n = 58 
 -1.32 
[1.31] 
n = 121 
 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) Results 
Source  
Sum of 
Squares  df  
Mean 
Square  F  p 
           
Ambiguity  335.80  1  335.80  1.69  0.20 
Cost  8.90  1  8.90  0.05  0.83 
Ambiguity by Cost   1437.74  1  1437.74  7.25  < 0.01 
Error  23206.34  117  198.35     
 
Panel C: Follow-Up Simple Effects Tests 
  df  t  p 
       
Low Ambiguity (Alt) / Low Cost > High Ambiguity / Low Cost  56  1.18  0.12* 
Low Ambiguity (Alt) / High Cost vs. High Ambiguity / High Cost  61  2.53  0.01 
High Ambiguity / High Cost vs. High Ambiguity / Low Cost  59  1.73  0.09 







This table presents descriptive statistics, an ANOVA model, and follow-up simple effects tests for participants’ relative 
willingness to invest judgments, using my alternative Low Ambiguity operationalization. Relative willingness to invest is 
the difference in a participant’s willingness to invest in ActiveCo and MoveCorp. I manipulate review ambiguity by 
varying how transparent the Regulator is regarding the outcomes from its review process. I manipulate access costs by 
varying the amount of effort required to access review correspondence.   
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